Transaction Search Form: please type in any of the fields below.
Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:41 pm
Time: 11:41 pm
Results for opium poppy cultivation
13 results foundAuthor: Pain, Adam Title: Opium Poppy Strikes Back: The 2011 Return of Opium in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces Summary: Opium poppy cultivation has re-emerged in Balkh and Badakhshan in 2011. In Badakhshan, it has spread across several districts in rainfed areas and, according to informal estimates, the cultivated area has doubled from official figures of 1,100 hectares (ha) in 2010 to around 2,200 ha. In Balkh—which was declared “poppy-free” in 2006—opium’s return has been more location-specific; it is currently being planted openly on a small scale in Chimtal District. While a rise in opium prices has played an important part, a range of contextual factors including power, insecurity, social identity, agro-ecology and location are also important in explaining the crop’s re-emergence, as well as the patterns of difference within and between the two provinces. Driven by a fall in production in the South in 2010, the rising price of opium is a contributing factor to the expansion of cultivation. However, this has also taken place in the context of a failing rural economy; many households are food insecure, rural employment is scarce and there is rising insecurity. In the eyes of many rural informants, promises made in 2006 to support the rural economy as a return for giving up opium poppy cultivation have not been met. There is also a sense, especially in Badakhshan, that southern provinces are being rewarded with greater levels of development funding despite their failure to give up the crop. Counter-narcotics policies and support to rural development do not appear to have generated the conditions that might encourage households to move permanently away from opium poppy cultivation. The real indicator of effective counter-narcotics strategies is to make farmers relatively insensitive to opium prices; this is clearly not yet the case. There are no easy solutions to the persistence of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. However, evidence from this study suggests a number of ways to improve both counternarcotics strategy and support for the development of the rural economy: • The notion of “poppy free” should be abandoned as an indicator of success. Supply reductions in one place can have price effects that shift production elsewhere. This reflects the irrepressible demand that continues to drive the opium market. • The re-emergence of cultivation in areas where it had declined highlights the limits of previous interventions. It also suggests the lack of a geographically joined-up counter-narcotics strategy. Provinces and districts are not islands and the return of opium cultivation to old areas is a reflection of this. • There is a need to recognise the significant political obstacles that exist to growth. The commodity market in urban centres such as Mazar-i-Sharif is characterised by non-competitive, exclusionary behaviour. A supply-side approach to agricultural development thus makes it difficult to give Afghanistan’s agricultural economy a competitive edge compared to its more powerful regional neighbours. This is especially important as there is also limited room to protect the domestic market from aggressive competition from outside. • The rural economy lacks domestic demand. A broader, less neo-liberal approach could involve using cash transfers and social protection measures to help reduce livelihood risks and increase local purchasing power. Combined with measures to increase agricultural productivity, this could help create the incentives to increase productivity and help reduce the risks of markets for the poor. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1116E%20Opium%20Poppy%20Strikes%20Back%20CS%202011.pdf Shelf Number: 123233 Keywords: Narcotics ControlOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: A Little Bit Poppy-free and a Little Bit Eradicated: Opium poppy cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2011-2012 Summary: While Balkh and Badakhshan have very different geographical, social, political, and historical contexts, it is hard to identify any factors which could significantly reduce cultivation of opium poppy in either province in the foreseeable future. In Balkh, some of the coercive approaches which have reduced opium poppy cultivation are not sustainable in the longer-term, especially where they go against the economic conditions prevailing in the rural economy. In Badakhshan, a half-hearted coercion has produced uneven results. In the context of the 2014 security transition, it is an open question as to whether the Afghan government and its international partners, preoccupied with other issues (e.g., security, presidential elections), will have the motivation and the means to maintain unpopular coercive approaches, especially where they require the application of consistent pressure on local officials and communities which may have different agendas. Household-level field research done during May 2012 in farming communities in two districts in Balkh (Chimtal, Char Bolak) and Badakhshan (Jurm, Khash) which had a history of opium poppy cultivation, revealed very different dynamics within the opium economy. In Balkh, analysis confirmed the role of state presence and coercion in suppressing opium poppy cultivation as well as the correlation of cultivation with insecurity, with poppy concentrated in areas inaccessible to the government. Balkh has retained its “poppy-free” status, first obtained in 2007, while also raising questions about metrics, as little independent or verifiable information is available on the insecure areas in which poppy is grown. It is also possible that in Balkh causality runs in both directions, and that at least some of the insecurity in areas in which opium poppy is found is the result of stresses and grievances connected with the suppression of cultivation. Deployment of local police(who have informally come to be called arbaki) was credited with improving security and helping to maintain the suppression of cultivation; the population is not confident that this security effect will endure, however, and they have raised concerns about the role that the “arbaki” may play, including allegations of involvement in poppy cultivation. In Badakhshan, analysis connected the decision of households to cultivate poppy with their efforts to resolve financial stress (including debt and asset sales) brought on by the long and harsh winter of 2011-12, and, based on the previous year’s experience, the lack of a credible threat of eradication. Among surveyed households, the number who reported growing poppy doubled from the previous year and the area devoted to poppy increased from four to ten percent of total area sown. Unlike in Balkh, where there has been one dominant leader who has been both motivated and capable of suppressing cultivation in most areas of the province, in Badakhshan power has been more contested and fragmented among local commanders and power holders, who have shown little interest in reducing cultivation, trafficking, and other illicit activities. During 2012, Badakhshan was estimated to have had a 13 percent increase in cultivated area, which moved the province into being a “moderate” rather than “low” producer of opium poppy. Also, unlike Balkh where cultivation is largely limited to two districts, cultivation is widely dispersed across the province’s 26 districts. Given Badakhshan’s mountainous geography and highly contested space, the reporting (post-fieldwork) of apparently much more extensive eradication raises the question of whether the authorities are attempting to impose their will in a more aggressive way than previously and, if so, what the reaction of communities and local power holders will be. While farming conditions in the spring of 2012 were much more promising than the previous year, analysis confirmed the importance of off-farm income in household livelihoods. Labour opportunities and wages in Balkh, especially Mazar-e Sharif (the provincial centre of Balkh), were much more plentiful than during the previous drought year. Meanwhile, in Badakhshan labourers were struggling to find work due to the delay in the start of the construction season. In both provinces, farming households, labourers, and shopkeepers spoke longingly of the “good old days” when the economy was thriving due to opium production and trade. While Badakhshan continues to be considered a drug transit route, this activity does not generate the same widespread incomes as did the extensive cultivation of the mid-2000s. The vast majority of surveyed households in Badakhshan were calculated to be existing on US$2 per person per day, with only about one-quarter meeting their grain requirements from their own production. With the political and security situation now on an unknown trajectory, reductions in cultivation may be more difficult to achieve or maintain, especially in an unstable or contested environment. The enormous pressure on power holders and aspirants, already understood to be preparing for post-2014 instability, to conclude local deals in order to control an area or resources will reduce incentives to adhere to national policies where such policies run up against local interests. In Balkh, which has served as a successful model not just of elimination of opium poppy but also economic development under a strong provincial administration, the shifting of emphasis from Kabul and from the international community may reduce the sorts of political incentives that have until now made it worth imposing unpopular policies. The anticipated contraction in the national economy due to the withdrawal of international spending and reduction in local investor confidence may reduce both household livelihoods opportunities and sources of patronage for power holders. Finally, given the dependence of so many households on off-farm income, pressure to relax the suppression of cultivation may rise in proportion to the anticipated contraction of the economy and the reduction in opportunities for work-related migration in the region. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2013. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2013 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1305E%20Opium%20in%20Balkh%20and%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study%20May%202013.pdf Shelf Number: 128976 Keywords: Drug EradicationIllicit DrugsNarcoticsOpiates (Afghanistan)Opium AbuseOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Fishstein, Paul Title: Evolving Terrain: Opium Poppy Cultivation in Balkh and Badakhshan Provinces in 2013 Summary: It is generally assumed that there will be significant increases in the level of opium poppy cultivation after the critical year 2014, when international military combat forces will withdraw and Afghanistan will select its next president. In 2012-13, at the national level, area cultivated increased for the third consecutive year, and total opium production rose significantly. With 410 hectares (ha) of opium poppy recorded in the province, for the first time since 2007 Balkh is no longer classified as "poppy-free," while Badakhshan saw an increase of 23 percent in area cultivated, despite reported eradication of the largest area of any province. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 23, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Balkh%20Badakhshan%20Case%20Study.pdf Shelf Number: 132136 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug TradeNarcoticsOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: "From Bad They Made It Worse": The concentration of opium poppy in areas of conflict in the provinces of Helmand and Nangarhar Summary: Levels of drug crop cultivation have long been seen as an indicator of the success or failure of counternarcotics efforts. However, to rely on this indicator is to misunderstand the socioeconomic and political processes that support farmers moving out of opium poppy cultivation, as well as the limited scope of many interventions currently categorized and budgeted as "counternarcotics" by the international community and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 26, 2014 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20(2).pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/NRM%20CS6%20ver%202%20(2).pdf Shelf Number: 132549 Keywords: Drug Abuse and AddictionDrug ControlOpium Poppy CultivationPoppy Cultivation |
Author: Kamminga, Jorrit Title: Opium poppy licensing in Turkey: A model to solve Afghanistan's illegal opium economy? Summary: The report analyses the Turkish opium licensing system as a way to illustrate the "normality" of such an industry. The latter function is important for the current debate on using similar systems in other countries. In Afghanistan, for example, the opium poppy is still solely associated with illegal drug consumption, drug trafficking, crime and insurgency. On the contrary, in Turkey, opium poppies are regarded as both traditional medicine and an essential part of a rich cooking tradition. As such, the poppy licensing industry in Turkey should be regarded less a direct example of how to implement a similar model in Afghanistan, but more as an illustration of an alternative, non-politicised way of looking at the opium poppy plant and its potential benefits for Afghanistan. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: International Council on Security and Development, 2011. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 2, 2014 at: http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/Opium_Licensing_Turkey_Jorrit_Kamminga.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Turkey URL: http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/Opium_Licensing_Turkey_Jorrit_Kamminga.pdf Shelf Number: 133549 Keywords: Drug PolicyDrug TraffickingHeroinIllegal DrugsOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Title: Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013 Summary: The narcotics trade poisons the Afghan financial sector and undermines the Afghan state's legitimacy by stoking corruption, sustaining criminal networks, and providing significant financial support to the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Despite spending over $7 billion to combat opium poppy cultivation and to develop the Afghan government's counternarcotics capacity, opium poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan hit an all-time high in 2013. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghan farmers grew an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2013, surpassing the previous peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. With deteriorating security in many parts of rural Afghanistan and low levels of eradication of poppy fields, further increases in cultivation are likely in 2014. As of June 30, 2014, the United States has spent approximately $7.6 billion on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Multiple sources of funding support these efforts, including the Department of Defense (DOD) Afghan Security Forces Fund, the State Department's (State) International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement fund, the DOD Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities fund, financial support from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the U.S. Agency for International Development's Economic Support Fund. Counternarcotics efforts include the development of Afghan government counternarcotics capacity, operational support to Afghan counternarcotics forces; encouragement of alternative livelihoods for Afghan farmers; financial incentives to Afghan authorities to enforce counternarcotics laws; and, in limited instances, counternarcotics operations conducted by U.S. authorities in coordination with their Afghan counterparts. Despite the significant financial expenditure, opium poppy cultivation has far exceeded previous records. Affordable deep-well technology has turned 200,000 hectares of desert in southwestern Afghanistan into arable land over the past decade. Due to relatively high opium prices and the rise of an inexpensive, skilled, and mobile labor force, much of this newly-arable land is dedicated to opium cultivation. Poppy-growing provinces that were once declared 'poppy free' have seen a resurgence in cultivation. Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, considered a model for successful counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts and deemed 'poppy free' by the UNODC in 2008, saw a fourfold increase in opium poppy cultivation between 2012 and 2013. The UNODC estimates that the value of the opium and its derivative products produced in Afghanistan was nearly $3 billion in 2013, up from $2 billion in 2012. This represents an increase of 50 percent in a single year. The attached opium cultivation figures and maps illustrate the increasing cultivation of opium in Afghanistan. Attachment I provides a graph of UNODC poppy cultivation data for 2002 through 2013. The graph includes data for Afghanistan as a whole as well as for two key opium producing provinces. The graph also includes information on some of the factors influencing the cultivation figures. The maps in attachments II and III depict the likely locations and concentrations of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Details: Arlington, VA: Special Inspector's Office, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: SIGAR-15-10-SP Special Report: Accessed October 23, 2014 at: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Special%20Projects/SIGAR-15-10-SP.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/Special%20Projects/SIGAR-15-10-SP.pdf Shelf Number: 133804 Keywords: Counter-NarcoticsDrug ControlNarcotics (Afghanistan)Opium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Moving with the Times: How Opium Poppy Cultivation has Adapted to the Changing Environment in Afghanistan Summary: This "watching brief" has described a number of trends with respect to agriculture, land settlement, and opium poppy in several areas of Afghanistan. It highlights two separate but highly related issues. First, what will be farmers' response to changes in technology and agro-economic conditions? While cost-reducing technology such as solar-powered tubewells may allow the cultivation of crops with lower returns than that of opium poppy, will farmers choose to grow these crops or will they stay with poppy? Will they even look to cultivate a second crop of opium poppy in May as some reports from the field suggest? Second, while the new technology has allowed the expansion of agricultural production to former desert areas and supported livelihoods for marginalised households, given Afghanistan's tenuous water resources (leaving aside climate change) and population growth rate, how sustainable is an agriculture that continues to deplete groundwater resources by allowing their use on an essentially "free" basis? Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Watching Brief: Accessed June 7, 2016 at: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1611E%20Moving%20With%20the%20Times.pdf Shelf Number: 139288 Keywords: NarcoticsNational ResourcesOpiumOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: Mansfield, David Title: Time to Move on: Developing an Informed Development Response to Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan Summary: After almost 15 years since the fall of the Taliban, the policy discussion on counter-narcotics remains uncertain of which way to proceed. In large part, this is because policy discussion is shaped by a superficial or misguided understanding of opium poppy and its role in rural livelihoods. This is not surprising given the disconnect that policymakers and the international community in Kabul have from rural realities, in large part due to the inability to get out of Kabul or even their own compounds. Another part is the natural tendency to downplay or even ignore problems which appear to be intractable. Many of the policy proposals reflect past thinking which has not proven successful, most notably the search for a “silver bullet” or one single crop that can compete with opium poppy. This focus is in large part the result of the way in which data and analysis have been presented to policy makers, in particular the annual estimates of opium area and yield presented by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) along with its analysis of the reasons why farmers grow opium poppy. The most problematic aspects of that methodology are 1) the analysis of why farmers grow opium poppy, and 2) the assumption of a binary choice between wheat and opium poppy. Additional shortcomings are the limitations of the profit maximization model; drugs “fetishism”; focus on gross rather than net returns; endless search for the "silver bullet" (the single crop) which will replace opium poppy; assumption of a homogenous farmer; flawed survey methodology which relies on single responses and fails to correct for social desirability bias; and, lack of willingness to incorporate the work of others. The analysis in this report is based on fieldwork undertaken in the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar during the harvest and planting seasons of the 2014/15 and 2015/16 agricultural years. The analytical approach is based on the livelihoods framework in which opium poppy is seen as just one crop in a larger, complex system of agricultural commodities, livestock, and off-farm and non-farm income opportunities. More than a decade of fieldwork has allowed the incorporation of the effects of politics and power on farmers' decision-making, as well as questions of varying conditions, especially those that prevail in such vastly different areas as the former desert areas of the southwest. The current approach uses multiple methodologies, including extensive surveys of farmers in the field along with GIS and geo-spatial mapping which assists with research site selection and allows visualization of changes over time in settlements and cropping patterns. Analysis also distinguishes between use of household and hired labour (extremely important in a high-input crop such as opium poppy) and between owner cultivated land and sharecropped land. It reflects variations in fieldwork sites with respect to resources, infrastructure, access to markets and tenure arrangements, so as to capture the diversity in rural Afghanistan. Data collection utilized indirect questions in the field with farmers themselves, thereby avoiding the kind of speculation and bias that interviewing rural elites typically produces. Of course, the usual caveats associated with fieldwork in rural Afghanistan should be kept in mind, and this work should be seen as a "first cut" or "snapshot" that tries to capture conditions within a particular time frame. Fieldwork confirmed that, contrary to conventional wisdom, dramatic change is taking place in Afghanistan's rural economy, as farmers experiment with new varieties, complex cropping systems, and new technology such as chemicals and solar-powered water pumps. In part due to the development of transport and communication infrastructure, rural areas are more and more integrated with urban markets, and off-farm employment has become an increasingly important component of household livelihoods. Not all of this change is positive or sustainable in the long run, especially that which drains aquifers and potentially causes harm to humans, and much of it comes out of a desperate attempt to deal with adversity both agronomic and man-imposed. One of the most striking and consequential transformations is the settling of the former desert areas of south and southwest Afghanistan. The deserts have been made to bloom, although much of the flowering is opium poppy and it is not clear how sustainable life in the former desert will be. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2016. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1623E-Time%20to%20Move%20on-Developing%20an%20Informed%20Development%20Response%20to%20Opium%20Poppy%20Cultivation%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 148016 Keywords: Drugs and CrimeHeroinNarcoticsOpium Poppy CultivationOpium Production |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Regional Office for East Asia and the Pacific. ASEAN Title: Evidence for enhancing resilience to opium poppy cultivation in Shan State, Myanmar: Implications for alternative development, peace, and stability Summary: In 2016, the annual village survey was conducted in 591 villages in Shan state, the main opium poppy cultivating area in Myanmar. An independent area estimation was not part of the survey this year; however, UNODC expanded largely on the socio‐economic analysis of opium cultivation in the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. Opium poppy continues to be an important part of the Shan State economy About 1 in 10 households in the villages surveyed in Shan State are directly involved in opium poppy cultivation. The share of villages that cultivate opium poppy and the share of households within these villages that participate have both decreased over the past year. However, opium poppy is still integral to the state’s economy, and there are many households who depend on poppy cultivation for their livelihood. Fewer villages and farmers are growing opium poppy There has been a reduction in the number of villages and households involved in opium poppy cultivation; however, accompanied by an increase in the average area under cultivation per household. The average area under opium poppy cultivation increased from 0.4 hectares per household in 2015 to 0.6 hectares in 2016. This concentration of cultivation confirms earlier observations. The average income in opium poppy villages is higher, but the positive impact on household finances is largely offset by higher costs of living The average annual household income is higher in villages where opium poppy is cultivated (US$2,261) than in non‐opium poppy villages (US$1,839). Farmers in opium poppy villages, however, were primarily buying food with the income from poppy cultivation. Moreover, there are several indications that people living in villages where opium poppy is grown face higher living costs than their peers in non‐opium poppy villages. Many opium poppy villages in East and North Shan are located in remote or highly inaccessible areas with low infrastructure coverage. For example, very few opium poppy villages have asphalt roads, and somewhat fewer of these villages have clinics than non‐growing villages (although village clinics are rare throughout East and North Shan, with such facilities operating in less than one in five villages). The nearest outside clinic also took twice as long to reach from opium poppy villages. The lack of clinics and roads means that health and transportation costs are higher for farmers in opium poppy villages in East and North Shan. Farmers in opium poppy villages face challenges in relying only on licit sources of income Across Shan State, cash crops – licit or illicit – are the main source of income for farmers. In non‐ opium poppy villages, cash crops, primarily rice, were cited as the primary source of income by nearly half of all surveyed village headmen. Before deciding to substitute opium poppy with licit crops, farmers would need to consider some challenges. Access to local markets for agricultural products is critical. None of the opium poppy cultivating villages had local markets, whereas 8 per cent of the non‐opium poppy villages had them. Moreover, the nearest market took more than two hours to reach on foot from opium poppy villages, compared to just under an hour from non‐ opium poppy villages. Daily wages were also markedly lower in poppy‐cultivating villages; the difference was greatest for male workers. These challenges make it more difficult to earn a living from licit activities in opium poppy villages than in villages where opium poppy is not grown. Distinct motivations for growing opium poppy in South Shan Several sustainable development indicators show a different situation in South Shan in comparison to East and North Shan. Villages which cultivate opium poppy in South Shan still have low levels of development but their characteristics are different from those in East and North Shan. In South Shan, the average income is higher and the infrastructure better than in East and North Shan, and more people are able to access salaried jobs, which are usually better remunerated and more stable. Moreover, according to the village headmen, the majority of households in South Shan, regardless of their opium poppy cultivation status, do not need to resort to drastic strategies to cope with food insecurity, such as reducing the number of meals per day, in contrast to East and North Shan. The higher incomes, better infrastructure and food security status in South Shan may indicate that opium poppy cultivation is primarily driven by capital accumulation, while in East and North Shan, cultivation seems to be more closely linked with subsistence needs. However, the relatively high income inequality among farmers in opium poppy villages in South Shan may suggest that there are a number of farmers who are not able to make ends meet also there. People in opium poppy villages are more dependent on forest resources, and more prone to experiencing environmental and climate‐related challenges Many households across Shan State depend on wood from local forests for cooking, particularly in villages where opium poppy is cultivated. More village headmen from opium poppy villages reported declining local forest quality in the last two years than their peers from non‐opium poppy villages. The quality of the drinking water is another concern, and again, the problem is more pronounced in opium poppy villages. There are also indications that opium poppy villages seem to be somewhat more affected by climate related shocks, like frost or drought, which could decrease crop yields and increase the price of food. Details: Thailand: UNODC - ASEAN, 2017. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 3, 2017 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2017/2016_Myanmar_Shan_Opium_Poppy_web.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2017/2016_Myanmar_Shan_Opium_Poppy_web.pdf Shelf Number: 144703 Keywords: Illegal DrugsIllicit CropsOpium Poppy Cultivation Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Murphy, Tommy E. Title: Following the Poppy Trail: Causes and Consequences of Mexican Drug Cartels Summary: We study the historical origins and consequences of Mexican cartels. We first trace the location of current cartels to the location of Chinese migration at the beginning of the XX century, and document that both events are strongly connected. We then use Chinese presence in 1930 as an instrument for cartel presence today. We find a positive link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes, such as lower marginalization rates, lower illiteracy rates, higher salaries, and better public services. We also report that municipalities with cartel presence have higher tax revenues and more political competition. Given that Chinese immigration at the end of the century was driven by elements largely exogenous to the drug trade, the link between cartel presence and good socioeconomic outcomes can be interpreted in a causal way. Previous research has shown that the presence of organized crime is associated with bad outcomes at the macro level (Pinotti, 2015) and has deep effects at individual level, making children more likely to be criminals in adulthood (Sviatschi, 2017a; 2017b). Our paper reconciles this previous literature with the fact that drug lords, the leaders of this particular form of organized crime, have great support in the local communities in which they operate. Details: Buenos Aires, Argentina: Universidad de San Andres, 2017. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 17, 2018 at: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Mexico URL: ftp://webacademicos.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc130.pdf Shelf Number: 148851 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceEconomics of CrimeOpium Poppy CultivationOrganized CrimeSocioeconomic Conditions and Crime |
Author: Pain, Adam Title: "Let Them Eat Promises": Closing the Opium Poppy Fields in Balkh and its Consequences Summary: In 2007, many pointed to the example of Balkh Province, where the reported area of opium poppy fell from 7200 hectares (ha) in 2005-06 to zero in 2006-07. Drawing on these area statistics, international agencies have claimed that incentives, and improvements in security and governance, preceded and led to the end of opium cultivation. Afghan officials offer a different interpretation of events and emphasise the failure to respond to the decline that has been achieved, effectively admitting that the closure was due to coercion. The field evidence presented in this report does not support claims that farmers' decisions to stop cultivating opium poppy stemmed from the provision of incentives or development - nor does it find evidence of improved governance or security. If anything, conditions are worse. Moreover, the report discovered that the sudden closure of opium poppy cultivation in 2006 in Balkh has prompted a decline in livelihood security for many rural households, the effects of which have been compounded by the harsh winter and subsequent failure of the rains in early 2008. Prices for livestock have fallen by half since last year, fodder prices have risen, labour wage rates have dropped by two-thirds since 2006, and grain prices have doubled or more. Emigration from downstream villages has been significant; in some cases, 90 percent of the male labour force has left, reportedly mostly to Iran. Not only is labour leaving, but households are also closing up their houses and departing for Pakistan and elsewhere. In short, there is now acute livelihood insecurity in Balkh. The claims for success have been built solely around the indicator of opium poppy area. There are two parties to this debate both using the same indicator but drawing different conclusions from it and for different reasons. For one party, the opium area indicator has been taken as evidence of underlying causal changes (incentives and development) for which opium area reduction is an outcome or goal achievement. The other party uses opium area as a result - something that has been delivered through direct action - and is looking for rewards for having achieved it. There are flaws in both positions that are mutually reinforcing in terms of their negative consequences. The positions are also contradictory but this difficulty appears to have been glossed over given the mutual desire to claim success. Above all, the methods used to end opium poppy cultivation in Balkh are contrary to the National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), but this has been ignored. What could better counter-narcotic policy practice in Balkh have been? First, the coerced closure of opium poppy cultivation should not have been accepted; the guidelines of the NDCS should have been followed, requiring careful monitoring of processes of change and rejecting opium area as an appropriate indicator at this stage. Second, a better understanding should have been developed regarding the underlying drivers of opium poppy cultivation in the district. This would have prompted the realisation that off-farm prospects of employment for the effectively landless poor who make up the majority of households - would be extremely limited once the opium economy dried up, and that measures would need to be taken and interventions designed to address this. Will the current demise of opium poppy cultivation hold in Balkh? Certainly downstream villages are not in a strong position to challenge it, being politically weak and water deprived. Will upstream villages rebel? Much depends on the extent to which patronage continues to flow from the authorities, but the evidence suggests upstream villages are far from happy with the consequences of the closure of the opium poppy economy, even though for those with land in such villages there is little evidence that livelihood security is at stake. Balkh though is not Nangarhar, which has more homogenous social identities that can unite to protest. Nevertheless, the impact of counter-narcotic policy's so-called "success" in Balkh could yet push disparate groups into a unified protest. Details: Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Case Studies Series: Accessed June 12, 2018 at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1350685/1227_1234789124_afghanistan.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1350685/1227_1234789124_afghanistan.pdf Shelf Number: 150520 Keywords: Narcotics ControlOpium Poppy Cultivation |
Author: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey: Cultivation and Production Summary: Key Findings Area under opium poppy cultivation increased by 63 percent since 2016, reaching a new record high. The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63 percent increase or 127,000 hectares more compared to the previous year. This level of opium poppy cultivation is a new record high and exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 (224,000 hectares) by 104,000 hectares or 46 percent. Strong increases were observed in almost all major poppy cultivating provinces. In Hilmand province alone, cultivation increased by 63,700 hectares (+79 percent) which accounted for about half of the total national increase. Strong increases were observed also in Balkh (+10,000 hectares or almost five times more than in 2016), Kandahar (+7,500 hectares or +37%), Nimroz (+6,200 hectares or +116%), and Uruzgan (+6,000 hectares or +39%). The majority (60%) of cultivation took place in the South of the country. The Western region accounted for 17% of total cultivation, the Northern region for 13% and the Eastern region for 7%. The remaining regions (North-eastern and Central) together accounted for 3%. Hilmand remained the country's major opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Badghis, Faryab, Uruzgan, Nangarhar, Farah, Balkh, Nimroz and Badakhshan. Opium poppy cultivation expanded to new regions and intensified where there was cultivation before. In 2017, the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan decreased from 13 to 10. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation increased from 21 to 24. Ghazni, Samangan and Nuristan provinces lost their poppy-free status. Ghazni had been poppy-free for more than two decades (since 1995), Samangan and Nuristan for almost 10 years (since 2007). Starting in 2014, the Northern region experienced a rapid expansion of opium poppy cultivation. In 2014, a total of 574 hectares was cultivated in three out of seven provinces (Baghlan, Faryab and Sari-Pul); in 2017, only one province remained poppy-free (Bamyan) and some 43,000 hectares were cultivated in the other six provinces. Cultivation in Balkh, which was poppy-free until 2014, expanded from 204 hectares in 2015 to 12,100 hectares in 2017. In Jawzjan, which was poppy-free between 2008 and 2015, cultivation increased from 409 hectares in 2016 to 3,200 hectares in 2017. In Sari-Pul (last time poppy-free in 2013), cultivation expanded from 195 hectares in 2014 to 3,600 hectares in 2017. Opium poppy cultivation intensified in the main opium-poppy cultivating provinces by holding a more significant share of the available agricultural land. In Hilmand, a third of the arable land was dedicated to opium poppy in 2017, whereas only 20% was under cultivation in 2016. Less drastically, but still significant increases in density could be observed in Uruzgan and Nangarhar where a fourth of the arable land was under opium poppy cultivation in 2017 compared to 19% in Uruzgan and 16% in Nangarhar in 2016. Total eradication of opium poppy increased by 395 hectares but remained very low. In 2017, 750 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in 14 provinces (355 hectares in 7 provinces in 2016). During the 2017 eradication campaign, six lives were lost and eight persons were injured. In 2016, eight lives were lost and seven persons were injured. Potential opium yield and production increased in 2017. Potential opium production was estimated at 9,000 tons in 2017, an increase of 87% from its 2016 level (4,800 tons). The increase in production is mainly a result of an increase in area under opium poppy cultivation, while an increase in opium yield per hectare also contributed. In 2017, the average opium yield amounted to 27.3 kilograms per hectare, which was 15% higher than in 2016. Yields increased in the Southern region by 19% (from 22.0 kilograms per hectare in 2016 to 26.2 kilograms per hectare in 2017), in the North-eastern region by 14% (from 31.2 to 35.4 kilograms per hectare) and in the Eastern region by 8% (from 32.4 to 34.9 kilograms per hectare). In the Central and Northern regions, yields decreased by 5% and 6% respectively and remained stable in the Western region. Accounting for 57% of national production, the Southern region continued to produce the vast majority of opium in Afghanistan. With 16% of national production, the Northern region was the second most important opium-producing region in 2017, followed by the Western region (13%) and Eastern region (9%). In response to the increased supply of opium, 2017 prices at harvest time decreased in all regions (between -7% in the Western region and - 50% in the North-eastern region) of Afghanistan except in the Southern region where prices only dropped in the months after the harvest. At almost US$ 1.4 billion (1.2 - 1.5 billion), equivalent to roughly 7% of Afghanistan's estimated GDP, the farm-gate value of opium production increased by 55% in 2017 as compared to past year. Reasons for the increase. There is no single reason for the massive 2017 increase in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The multiple drivers are complex and geographically diverse, as many elements continue to influence farmers' decisions regarding opium poppy cultivation. Rule of law-related challenges, such as political instability, lack of government control and security, as well as corruption, have been found to be main drivers of illicit cultivation. Also impact farmers' decisions, for example scarce employment opportunities, lack of quality education and limited access to markets and financial services continue to contribute to the vulnerability of farmers towards opium poppy cultivation. A combination of events may have exacerbated some of these elements and may have led to the large increase in 2017. The shift in strategy by the Afghan government - focusing its efforts against anti-government elements (AGE) in densely populated areas - may have made the rural population more vulnerable to the influence of AGE. This may have subsequently contributed to the strong increase in the area under opium poppy cultivation. Political instability and increased insecurity particularly affected the Northern region, where opium poppy cultivation expanded drastically in the last couple of years. Generally, the weaker engagement of the international aid community may also have reduced the socio-economic development opportunities in rural areas. In Hilmand province, additional factors may have played a role. In 2017, reports from the field indicate that more cheap labour for harvesting might have become available. In combination with increasing yields in 2016, this could have motivated many farmers to take up or expand opium poppy cultivation. The opium harvest requires a large number of skilled labourers, who often come from other provinces of Afghanistan and even from neighbouring countries. In past years, there have been reports of a lack of workers, caused by the on-going fights within Hilmand, which may have led farmers to restrict their investments in opium poppy cultivation to avoid the risk of unharvested fields. The continuing advances in agriculture, including the use of solar panels for powering irrigation pumps and fertilizers and pesticides, may have made opium poppy cultivation increasingly profitable even under unfavourable natural conditions. Solar panels for irrigation seem to have replaced diesel pumps in many areas. These panels require a sizable initial investment, but have lower running costs than diesel-powered pumps and thus can turn desert areas into highly productive arable land at a relatively low cost. The nation-wide high opium farm-gate prices of 2016 might have facilitated some of these investments. Future challenges The 2017 record levels of opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan create multiple challenges for the country, its neighbours and the many other countries that are transit for or destination of Afghan opiates. The significant levels of opium poppy cultivation and illicit trafficking of opiates will probably further fuel instability, insurgency and increase funding to terrorist groups in Afghanistan. More high quality, low cost heroin will reach consumer markets across the world, with increased consumption and related harms as a likely consequence. Addressing the opiate problem in Afghanistan remains a shared responsibility. Only a small share of the revenues generated by the cultivation and trafficking of Afghan opiates reaches Afghan drug trafficking groups. Many more billions of dollars are made from trafficking opiates into major consumer markets, mainly in Europe and Asia. Moreover, the transformation of opium into heroin is likely to bring increased trafficking of precursor substances. Tons of precursor chemicals will potentially be diverted from licit international markets and smuggled into Afghanistan to supply manufacturers of heroin. In Afghanistan, one of the least-developed countries worldwide, the impact of the illicit drug cultivation and production on economic, environmental and social development, continues to be multifaceted. The large increase in opium production will reinforce the negative consequences of the already existing large-scale production of opiates. The expanding illicit economy, which in many provinces has permeated rural societies and made many communities dependent on the income from opium poppy, will further constrain the development of the licit economy and potentially further fuel corruption. The increased levels of opium poppy cultivation also have the potential to exacerbate existing environmental damage caused by over-exploitation of the land for opium. The increased availability of opium and heroin in the country might further raise the social and economic costs associated with the consumption of opiates for drug users, their families, and for society in general. To support the Afghan Government in its efforts to counter illicit crop cultivation, continuing analysis and monitoring of the links between the rule of law, illicit drug cultivation, production, and trafficking is required. The forthcoming MCN/UNODC socio-economic survey report will discuss these factors in detail, presenting an in-depth analysis of the risk factors related to illicit cultivation of opium, as well as the possible consequences and policy considerations for Afghanistan and the international community following this year's record cultivation. Details: Vienna, Austria: 2017. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2019 at: http://mcn.gov.af/Content/files/Afghanistan%20Opium%20Survey%202017%20(Cultivation%20and%20Production).pdf Year: 2017 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://mcn.gov.af/en/page/access-to-information/14115/14116 Shelf Number: 154100 Keywords: Development AssistanceDrug CultivationDrug TraffickingFarm-Gate ValueIllicit Crop CultivationIllicit EconomyIllicit TraffickingOpium Poppy CultivationOpium ProductionOpium YieldRule of Law |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2018: Cultivation and Production Summary: Area under opium poppy cultivation decreased by 20% since 2017 but remains at very high levels. The total opium poppy cultivation area in Afghanistan was estimated at 263,000 (242,000 - 283,000) hectares in 2018, a 20% or 65,000 hectares decrease compared to the previous year. It is the second highest measurement since the beginning of systematic opium poppy monitoring and recording in 1994. The level of 2018 exceeds the third highest level of 2014 by 17% or 39,000 hectares. Opium poppy cultivation decreased by some 24,000 hectares (-56%) in the Northern region, by 23,200 hectares (-43%) in the Western region and by 15,000 hectares (-8%) in the Southern region. The strong decreases in the Northern and parts of the Western regions were mainly attributed to the adverse effects of a drought. Most of the opium poppy cultivation took place in the Southern region (69%), followed by the Western region (12%). The Eastern and Northern regions accounted for 8% and 7% of total cultivation, respectively. The North-eastern and Central regions together accounted for 4% of the total cultivation. Hilmand remained the country's leading opium poppy cultivating province, followed by Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Nangarhar. The number of poppy-free provinces in 2018 remained at 10, the same number as in 2017. Nuristan province regained its poppy-free status but Takhar province, which had been poppy-free since 2008, lost it. The number of provinces affected by opium poppy cultivation remained at 24. Crops in the Northern region and in Badghis province were heavily affected by a drought. Cultivation of opium poppy in Balkh decreased by 30% from 12,100 hectares in 2017 to 8,500 hectares in 2018. In Jawzjan, opium poppy cultivation decreased by 90% from 3,200 hectares in 2017 to 338 hectares this year, and in Badghis cultivation decreased by 72% from 24,700 hectares in 2017 to 6,970 hectares in 2018. In 2018, 406 hectares of opium poppy were eradicated in four provinces, compared to 750 hectares in 14 provinces in 2017. During the 2018 eradication campaign, five lives were lost, and two persons were injured (six lives were lost and eight injured in 2017). Potential opium yield and production decreased in 2018, reducing the potential amount of heroin produced from Afghan opium. Potential opium production was estimated at 6,400 (5,600 - 7,200) tons in 2018, a decrease of 29% from its 2017 level (9,000 tons). The decrease in production was due to decreases in area under opium poppy cultivation and opium yield per hectare. The average opium yield in 2018 was estimated at 24.4 kilograms per hectare, which was 11% lower than in 2017. Yields in the Central, Eastern and Northern regions decreased notably by 47%, 29% and 19% respectively. Yields decreased by 8% in the Southern region and remained stable in the Western and North-eastern regions. The Southern region continued to produce most of the opium in Afghanistan (68% of national production), followed by the Western (11%), Eastern and Northern regions (8% each). The North - eastern and Central regions accounted for 5%. After accounting for consumption of raw opium in the region of Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, it can be estimated that 5,000 to 5,300 tons of opium are potentially available for heroin production in and outside of Afghanistan. This can potentially yield some 360 to 610 tons of heroin of export quality (between 50 and 70 per cent purity) or 250 to 300 tons of pure heroin base. Details: Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, 2018. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 10, 2019 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium_survey_2018.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-opium-survey-2018-cultivation-and-production Shelf Number: 156356 Keywords: Afghanistan Drug Cultivation Drug Production Drug Traffickers Heroin Lab Illicit Markets Opium Opium Poppy Cultivation |